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Why the Mind has a Body. By C. A. STRONG. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1903. — pp. x, 355.

"The reader will find in this book," writes the author in his preface, "(1) a sketch of an explanation of the connection of mind and body; (2) a proposal, based thereon, for a settlement of the controversy between the parallelists and the interactionists." The explanation is in substance the one "which is implied in the panpsychism of Fechner and Clifford," and the striking title of the work has been chosen "with the object of putting this panpsychist pretension distinctly on record." In the light of this explanation, Professor Strong will show that parallelism, so far from denying the efficiency of mind, involves and implies it.

The inquiry undertaken is thus essentially metaphysical. But contemporary discussions of the problem as to the relation of mind and body are mainly concerned with the causal issue. Does the causal influence run in both directions, from body to mind and from mind to body, as interactionism holds; or, does it run only in one direction, from body to mind, as automatism would have us believe; or, finally, are the parallelists right in denying the causal influence in either direction? This is primarily a question of fact; but, could we settle the issue by empirical considerations, still we should not rest satisfied without going further and seeking in some ultimate metaphysical theory to discover how and why mind and body are connected at all. So one is bound sooner or later to plunge into metaphysics in order to make any one of the theories intelligible.

But it happens that we cannot even settle the question as to the causal relation by any available empirical data, nor is it likely that we ever shall be able to do so. The facts admit of interpretation in terms of interactionism, automatism, or parallelism; and there are difficulties in the way of accepting any one of these views as usually interpreted. Part I of the work before us (pp. 1–160) is given over to this empirical inquiry. Professor Strong's analysis is keen, his discussion comprehensive and transparently lucid. The study of the facts, it is found, lends support to no particular causal theory. It gives us a single positive result, the law of psychophysical correlation. "This law includes two propositions: first, that consciousness as a whole never occurs except in connection with a brain process; secondly, that particular mental states never occur except in connection with particular brain events" (p. 66). It might be fairly objected that the facts to which appeal is made are hardly sufficient to establish the universal negative of this second proposition, though they may point that way; and certainly we want more evidence when our author later interprets the relation in terms of a third proposition to the effect that the particular brain-event corresponding to the particular mental state "mimics" the latter "in all its details."

The demonstration of causal relations between physical events involves, Professor Strong holds, besides the determination of cause by the criterion of uniformity, "the construction of a continuous phenomenal series reaching from the cause to the effect," and "the demonstration of qualitative and quantitative relations." Since these things clearly cannot be established as between mental and physical events, the causal argument would seem to make for parallelism. "But its validity is hypothetical, resting on the assumption that mental events are simultaneous with their cerebral correlates. . . . The argument from the principles of biology appears to prove the mind efficient; but it is subject to the difficulty regarding the origin of consciousness. The argument from the principle of the conservation of energy raises a strong presumption, not amounting to demonstrative proof, that the contrary is the case. Thus two great branches of natural science seem arrayed against each other. Physics and biology appear to authorize opposite conclusions concerning the efficiency of mind" (pp. 152–160).

Thus a study of the various empirical arguments adduced in support of the several theories of the relation of mind and body reveals their insufficiency to justify a final decision; and we are forced over into the metaphysical inquiry. Here we must first determine exactly what we mean by the highly ambiguous terms 'mind' and 'matter,' which are generally employed in a most uncritical way. Only when we have succeeded in doing this, shall we be able to assign to each of the causal theories its definite meaning, and to decide finally between them.

Body, and matter generally, is resolved, on the basis of the usual phenomenalistic arguments, into "our perceptions." But this Berkleian idealism (and, it may be added parenthetically, no other form of idealism is given serious consideration) gives us a "piecemeal fragmentary world," and not the continuous and abiding universe of physics. Hence, though a logical theory, and an adequate transcript of the facts, it is not convincing. And since, according to it, perceived events cannot be explained by means of preceding events which were not perceived, and "on the idealistic theory did not happen at all," it "leaves the need for genetic understanding unsatisfied."

Still, the continuous and abiding matter that science conceives is not accessible to perception, has none of the sensible qualities, and is, therefore, properly speaking, not material. Make the scientist's realism critical, and, our author holds, physical occurrences acquire the needed permanence by being regarded as the symbols of extra-mental realities, things-in-themselves, that continue to exist. It is *as if* physical occurrences had permanent existence just as the scientist supposes. They do not thus exist as physical objects, nor yet as bare possibilities of perception, but rather as real possibilities, real dispositions, as it were, of the natural order (pp. 188–192).

It may be doubted whether the scientist would recognize his realism in this guise; and it is certain that any form of idealism that involves the belief in a permanent non-temporal self, — any that is not sheer phenomenalism, — would satisfy the requirements of the scientific mind, and "the need for genetic understanding," at least as well as the author's so-called "critical realism." Of course, such idealisms would not make possible a genetic understanding of the real self, for that self is, according to them, not subject to genesis. But does Professor Strong's theory satisfy either the scientist's or the plain man's realism? It evidently depends upon the meaning given to these extra-mental realities, or things-in-themselves. They are conceived as "mental in their nature." But what is mind? The mind is "resolved into a series of mental states." More properly, the present ego is the state of consciousness at present immediately intuited, — "experienced," but "not known." In memory, we are told, the past state recalled "really *is* another consciousness." Apparently, then, another ego witnessed the past state. This is introducing discontinuity with a vengeance. The scientist's continuous world would seem in a sad case. And how we should ever know the series of states, those different consciousnesses, how 'the other fellow's' experience would ever get to be mine, remains a mystery.

The discussion of the ego in the brief chapter on consciousness is far from adequate. For example, the theory of a non-phenomenal subject is disposed of cavalierly in a couple of pages, mainly on the ground (for this error is common to the three objections urged) that that theory involves "extruding the ego from experience," which is precisely what that theory affirms to be impossible. However, while not extruding the ego from experience, this theory may indeed consistently hold that the non-phenomenal ego can never be completely experienced, in the sense of being immediately perceived, in any one, or in the sum of all of the states of consciousness. But, properly, the term 'experience' should not be taken in the restricted sense seemingly implied in Professor Strong's criticism. And, of course, if experience were completely intelligible *minus* the permanent non-phenomenal ego, its assumption were needless. But I know of no philosopher guilty of denying this. The strictures made are thus wholly wide of the mark. Consciousness, Professor Strong holds, is real "as long as it lasts," — "as real as anything can be. It is the very type of reality, an integral part of the universe of things" (p. 210). But what we should greatly like to know is how, on the author's view of consciousness and the ego, we should ever be able to conceive that universe of things.

"The relation between mind and body," writes Professor Strong, "will evidently be an essentially different thing, according as the body is the symbol of a reality external to consciousness, or only a phenomenon within consciousness" (p. 212). And a large portion of the book is taken up with the discussion of the possibility, the proof, and the nature of things-in-themselves, which are defined as "realities external to consciousness of which our perceptions are the symbols." The existence of things-in-themselves cannot be immediately known, but only inferred; and, as they never could be given immediately in experience, "the hypothesis of their existence can never be verified," and we must remain more or less in the dark concerning their nature (cf. p. 192). But "the legitimacy of the general class to which things-in-themselves belong" is established, Professor Strong thinks, by our undoubted knowledge of the reality of other minds. Other minds are for us simply other existences, and our knowledge of them is "transcendent" ("not empirical"). Neither the external nor the internal senses lend the slightest testimony to their existence, yet we know "with perfect certainty" that they exist. Inasmuch, however, as the senses can give no valid testimony on this point, we have a kind of knowledge that is founded "neither on reason nor [on] experience, but solely on instinct" (p. 219, ff.). It would have been well to probe deeper into the grounds of this belief, instead of proceeding, as the author does, simply to "take the knowledge of other minds for granted and use it as a test of epistemological principles." And if this belief is founded neither on reason nor on experience, by what right do we call it knowledge?

Professor Strong has several "proofs of things-in-themselves":

1. Their existence must be assumed "in order to fill in the gaps between individual minds, and give coherence and intelligibility to our conception of the universe. Without them, the universe would consist wholly of individual minds with gaps of nothingness between,

and our philosophy be one of pluralism. But the fact that causal influences get across the gaps proves that these are filled" (p. 259). (But would not this interpolation of a number of things-in-themselves merely multiply the gaps to be bridged, substituting many small breaks for one large leap? It is like trying to make a line out of spots by filling in a lot of mathematical points. For, on the theory of reality which this book presents, these things-in-themselves are, as it were, 'chopped off with a hatchet' one from another; and will prove as intractable in philosophy as the hard unsociable atoms of early physics proved in natural science. It is hard to see how these things-in-themselves could turn into a continuous world of reality by a mere increase in their number, unless we tacitly assume the existence of an inclusive consciousness or a non-phenomenal subject.)

2. Our perceptions are undoubtedly conditioned by physiological events. Every phenomenalistic theory must go to ship-wreck on this fact. But, if we only assume the existence of things-in-themselves, we have a way out. For then the physical train connecting the extra bodily object with the brain-event can be regarded as symbolizing a real causal train acting upon the mind from without. "The physical train that appears to exist in advance of the perception is simply a second manifestation of the constituent links of that real train, acting by means of collateral real trains, upon some other mind, or conceivably upon the same mind" (p. 264).

3. "The phenomenalistic account of the origin of mind is like the view that the brain process does not arise out of simpler physical facts. . . . It is a sort of psychological vitalism, which not only denies derivation from the inorganic but actually ignores the latter's existence" (p. 270). If, however, we assume the inorganic world to be symbolic of things-in themselves, mental in their nature but with a simpler kind of mentality, the evolution of minds out of them, and simultaneously of the brain out of their symbols, becomes conceivable.

We need not examine these arguments further, for we are told that, after all, the leap is "irrational." "Things-in-themselves cannot be logically demonstrated in such a way as to extort conviction from the skeptic." But, Professor Strong adds, other minds are in the same case. We are led to believe in *them*, not by "reasoning, but by some deep pre-rational instinct, like that on which our faith in memory rests." Our "inference of things-in-themselves is exactly analogous to that of other minds." For our part, we cannot see that the analogy extends any further than this, that both inferences are, on our author's showing, founded "neither on reason nor on experience," but are "non-rational," "instinctive," or the deliverance of some "deep pre-rational instinct." This is almost as bad as resting the case on an "ultimate inexplicability." And it is strange that Professor Strong should have rested content with the appeal to a non-rational instinct for a belief he holds to be necessary in order to make the world "intelligible."

Bad arguments do not become sound by being repeated. I infer Gaius to be a rascal, for I hate him. I have neither reason nor experience to warrant the inference, but a deep pre-rational instinct guides me. Titus also arouses sentiments of hatred. He must therefore be a rascal too, for — the cases are exactly analogous. Analogy with an inference based neither on reason nor on experience is nothing to brag of. By this sort of reasoning almost anything might be established. A believer in witches and warlocks might argue thus. *Their* existence is not proved by reason or by experience, but a non-rational instinct is enough, and he feels that they are necessary to make his world "intelligible." If, however, the world is in truth made intelligible by any hypothesis, reason and experience must supply its grounds. The method which Professor Strong employs in this part of his work is a dangerous one, and above all to be deprecated in philosophical discussions. Such a procedure simply confuses the issue. More or less plausible, but logically unsound, reasonings may be adduced in support of any view whatever. But the critical thinker should avoid these snares, which usually have no other effect than to bolster up pre-rational prejudices. So it seems to me that in the theory of things-in-themselves here set forth we have nothing but an attempted faith-cure of the ills of phenomenalism, — defining faith scholastic-wise as *voluntaria certitudo absentium;* and the "arguments" for their existence should be entitled *fides quærens intellectum.*

Having reached things in themselves, Professor Strong argues that they must be mental in their nature. "Since consciousness is the only reality of which we have any immediate knowledge, and therefore our only sample of what reality is like, we have no other conception of a reality" (p. 295). Moreover, "individual minds arise out of them by evolution." Unfortunately the argument proves too much; for our only sample is shorn of all that makes it significant in the process of simplification when we pass back to our progenitors in the hypothetical "simpler mental facts" corresponding to the "simpler physical facts" (the phenomena of physics and chemistry) out of which the brain process arises. Moreover, the unity which

Professor Strong assumes in this world of things-in-themselves is purely verbal, until we can explain how they are related, what their action on one another means, how we are to think it. We have called them all mental, by a somewhat violent hypothesis, and our mind is set at rest. But what should we say of a physicist who thought he had reached unity and continuity when of all physical occurrences he pronounced the word 'material'! It does not help matters simply to say that these things-in-themselves together "constitute a single system, whose continuity and order are symbolized by the continuity and order of the physical world" (p. 346), unless we can intelligibly interpret this unity and continuity as it holds within the real or mental order.

Professor Strong calls his view "psychophysical idealism." It combines "psychological solipsism" with "ontological realism," and promises a solution of the problem of the relation of mind and body that will guarantee real efficiency to the mind, and, at the same time, deny its physical efficiency, that will therefore satisfy the demands alike of parallelist and interactionist. The resulting doctrine, however, while supposed to "preserve a formal parallelism," is in truth not a doctrine of parallelism at all, but one of "identity." Consciousness *is* the reality symbolized by the brain process. The brain process, as part of the physical order, is merely a phenomenon, and its reality consists in its being perceived. When actually perceived, the mental event of which it is the symbol has preceded it, and may therefore be spoken of as its cause. But, adds Professor Strong, "what if the parallelist, by the brain events which he asserts to be simultaneous with mental states, means not the perceptions but the events perceived, the only intelligible explanation of the latter being that they are events-in-themselves? What if the simultaneity he asserts is really between mental states and the real events for which the brain-events stand?" (p. 342). But these real events are the identical mental states in question. Hence, to keep the formal parallelism, the brain-event must be regarded simply "as the mental state itself regarded from the point of view of the perception," and then in truth we have "no parallelism, but a single series." I find it hard to carry out this doctrine, and it seems to me that the author himself does not succeed in doing so. Although we have done away with a "real parallelism," forthwith a phenomenal parallelism turns up. "One of the two series is not real but only phenomenal, it is a shadow cast by one consciousness on another or on its latter [later?] self, and having no existence apart from the two; and the parallelism necessarily shares the phenomenal character of its physical member" (p. 343). We have, it would seem, a sort of rivalry between our psychological idealism, and our metaphysical realism. Thus the symbol, the physical occurrence, is held not to exist save in being actually perceived, but then it exists no longer merely as symbol but as reality in the perceiving consciousness. The symbol comes into existence after the real event it symbolizes, and then it is itself a real event in another consciousness. We have thus only realities, and a single series, or a number of single series in the various perceiving minds. But, again, the brain-event is regarded as the "shadow" of the conscious state, which would seem to make its appearance simultaneous, and the parallelism returns. But, whichever way we take it, is not the whole problem as to the relation of mind and body still to solve? For that problem, even if subsumed under that of the relation of reality and phenomenon, still calls for an explanation of the latter relation. If the phenomenon, the brain-event, is the "shadow" of the mental event, the latter is thereby made at least its part cause; if the "symbol," its regular appearance in the wake of its reality, the conscious state, without some causal bond that reaches it *in its character as symbol* is just the mystery of the relation of mind and body. And if we reduce the parallelism to a single series, then the problem of the relation of mind and body is still on our hands in the fact that some of these realities are perceptions and common property, with a unity and continuity of their own,— and that, in spite of the fact that they are supposed to get their entire reality in many distinct and separate minds, — while others are not perceptions and are strictly private property; and the puzzle is how one group of these realities can act on the other which seems to be a closed system.

The solution offered may perhaps be symbolized as follows: A is angry at E and determines to strike him. Between his intention and E's pain a number of physical occurrences intervene, — the outgoing current, the muscular contraction, the blow, the incoming current, etc. The series may be represented thus:

$$\frac{A}{a}\, b\, c\, d\, \frac{E}{e},$$

— a, b, c, d, and e being phenomena, and giving a continuous chain. But A causes E. How is this possible, with the gaps existing between them? We fill in the gaps by supposing the actual chain to be

$$\frac{A}{a}\ \frac{[B]}{b}\ \frac{[C]}{c}\ \frac{[D]}{d}\ \frac{E}{e},$$

— the bracketed capitals representing the realities, the things-in-themselves, of which *b*, *c*, and *d* are the symbols. But the case is not so simple as this. We have apparently for the old dualism a continuous distinction between substance and shadow. But these would-be shadows, as entering into some consciousness or other, are 'real,' — are entitled to capitalization in our formula. Their degredation to 'lower case' is the result of a sort of metaphysical illusion. *b*, *c* and *d*, as they actually are, are mental states of egos active in *A* and *E*, and of any other consciousness that may happen to experience them. Only after we have first ejected them from the mind and given them a kind of spurious independent existence, do we feel the necessity of in some way regarding them as representing their own particular realities (or things-in-themselves). Yet it is this very illusion that makes the gap which Professor Strong invents his things-in-themselves to fill. In reality, the gap does not exist; and, if it did, to fill it by assuming, corresponding to the intervening events in the physical series, things-in-themselves *B*, *C*, and *D*, is to satisfy the passion for continuity with a name. The continuity between *A* and *E via B*, *C*, and *D* remains unintelligible, even if we conceive *B*, *C*, and *D* after the analogy of consciousness. It is as if Arthur, wishing to communicate with Edgar, Arthur's familiar (his brain-event, *fidus Achates*), should touch Bob's familiar, who should stir up Charles's familiar, who should arouse Dick's familiar, who should awaken Edgar's familiar, when lo! Edgar is appraised of Arthur's rèsentment. But why shouldn't Arthur go straight to Edgar? Or, if there must be real, as well as phenomenal go-betweens, why should they not, being conceived after the analogy of consciousness, enter into the game as other consciousnesses do? Professor Strong makes the gap that occasions the difficulty, and that because of his inadequate conception of the ego, and, in general, of idealism. The ego, he holds, is not in space. Is it any more truly *in* time?

Perhaps philosophy would make surer progress if philosophers would more frequently detach problems, as Professor Strong has done, and give them separate and exhaustive treatment. And I think this is the main value of this work. It brings clearly to light the many difficulties involved in the problem considered, and should at least have the negative value of putting an end to such superficial solutions of the issue as are generally met with in the discussions of philosophers who lightly settle the matter with a few passing comments. It may indeed be that a whole system is involved in the attempt to work out any serious problem. No matter for that. It will be more likely to be one, and not several conflicting systems, if a single problem is held persistently in view than if one indite a book *de omnibus rebus*. Professor Strong's book also, it seems to me, brings out very clearly the needs that must be met before we can expect to find a satisfactory solution of the problems that it considers. Some of these are: a deeper discussion of the basis of the inference to other minds, and of the meaning and method of the action of mind on mind, and thus of the significance of the unity and continuity in the world of mental realities; a fuller investigation of the nature and the import of the 'transcendence' involved, as the author rightly points out, in memory and perception, as well as in our knowledge of other minds; a more comprehensive treatment of idealism, consciousness, and the ego; and a more searching examination of the notion of causality.

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Outlines of Psychology. An Elementary Treatise with Some Practical Applications. By JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1903.—pp. xxvii, 379.

It goes without saying that Professor Royce's book is a fresh and independent treatment of psychology, rich in suggestion. In his introductory chapter on "Definitions and Explanations," he first admirably states the difference between the inner psychical facts and the outer facts, which are "public property," and then—in the opinion of the present writer—rather overstates the social and 'descriptive' nature of the science of psychology. The chapters which follow, on the "Physical Signs of the Presence of Mind" and on "Nervous Conditions," include nothing new except a statement of Loeb's conception of the 'tropism' and the suggestion (later to be developed) that the tropism may be treated as a parallel to some psychic fact. As "General Features of Conscious Life," Royce next considers, very effectively, the unity and the variety of consciousness, "the fact that at any time whatever is present tends to form an always incomplete but still in some respects single conscious condition," and the "equally obvious fact" that "the one conscious state of the moment is always a unity consisting of a multiplicity." The chapter concludes with a criticism of the theory that "our total mental state is . . . a unity consisting of certain ultimate sensations and feelings that we cannot ourselves detect except indirectly." To the present writer this criticism seems unnecessary, because the 'mind-stuff' hypothesis, which it opposes, so long ago slipped out of psycho-